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Article 4

Reason and the Resolution of Disputes
Onora O'Neill*
Can reasoned argument help end disputes and conflicts? A
colleague of mine once remarked that where he came
from-Long Island, as it happens-arguments were something
parents had on Saturday nights. Others have a more benign view
of the matter: they hold, or at least hope, that reason, which
trades in arguments, is at least a desirable and sometimes an effective way of settling differences.
This disagreement is in part little more than a concern with
different matters. My colleague was pointing out that many people
equate arguments with uses of argument, and in particular with
aggressive and intemperate uses of argument, hence with fights,
rather than with the logical structures prized by those who admire
reason. Anyone who thinks arguments can embody reason, rather
than mere antagonism and forensics, might still hope there will be
fewer fights if we become better at introducing the calming influence of logical form and right reason into our arguments and so
into our disputes: they will agree that arguing as such has little to
commend it, but will pin some hope on reasoned arguing.
My aim here is to discuss what reason can and cannot offer
towards the resolution of disputes, and to consider whether it
provides what its admirers claim. Even if it offers much, negotiat-ing the acceptance of this offer-that is bringing disputants to use
reason rather than to fight-will often be formidably difficult. I
shall say nothing of the ways in which disputants 'could be got to
use reason rather than to rely on other tactics. This is not because
there is nothing to be said: proposals for changing the ways in
which disputes are conducted have been much discussed and undertaken not only by mediators, bargainers and negotiators, but
also (perhaps impurely) by politicians, lawyers, counsellors and
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HUNGER- AN ESSAY ON POVERTY, DEVELOPMENT AND JUSTICE (1986) and CONSTRUCTIONS
OF REASON: EXPLORATIONS OF KANT'S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY (1989).
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many other experts. I will not trespass on their territories, which I
am not even competent to chart. All that I hope to contribute is
some reflections on the question whether, if reasoning could be
introduced into disputes, this could help resolve them. This is not,
however, a pointless task, for there would be little point in laboring to conform our own or others' activities to standards of reason
if these are in any case illusory standards, or if their adoption
could not help resolve disputes.
In this century there have been many ready to insist that the
alleged contrast between reason and other ways of settling disputes
is illusory. The unmasking of reason's supposedly usurped authority
has
at
times
become
a
major
cultural
industry:
deconstructionists and other postmodernists are in the vanguard
today, but close behind them we find the rather more numerous
ranks
of communitarians
and
committed
greens.'
The
communitarians demote reason to the accepted standards of wider, but not universal, scope: they denounce what they term "the
Enlightenment project," and its political wing, which they identify
with liberalism. Many greens discern a malign alliance between
reason and the attempts to dominate nature which may lead us to
global disaster.
In the face of this onslaught the defenders of reason seem
strangely silent and ineffective. I think it is not hard to see what
makes them hesitate. Their problem is surely that it is not clear
how they should defend reason: to provide a reasoned defense of
reason looks as if it must backfire, since it will be circular-and
avoiding circular arguments is thought to be part of what it is to
reason; on the other hand, an unreasoned defense of reason appears to concede the case against reason by allowing that something other than reason is fundamental.
A direct answer to this challenge is, I believe, possible; I have
sketched it elsewhere.2 However, here I want to take the low road
rather than the high road, and look at particular aspects of rea-

I A boilerplate bibliography of these large movements of thought is hardly useful.
However, a useful starting point for anyone unfamiliar with these vast literatures would
include ALASDAIR MAcINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (1984)

and

ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988) for communitarian
positions and RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY AND SOLIDARITY (1989) for a version
of postmodernism much discussed in the English speaking world.
2 See ONORA O'NEILL, CONSTRUCTIONS OF REASON: EXPLORATIONS OF KANT'S PRACICAL PHILOSOPHY (1989) (hereinafter CONSTRUCTIONS OF REASON) and Onora O'Neill, Vindicating Reason, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO KANT (Paul Guyer ed., 1992).
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soning that have been called to task by the various skeptics about
reason: Instead of trying to show how a vindication of reason is in
principle possible, I shall start by considering some of the standard claims that are made for and against particular conceptions
of what it would be to rely on reason in practical affairs. I shall
say nothing about those processes of sorting and sifting, of comparing and articulating, which are presumed to be common to
theoretical and practical uses of reason, and nothing about any
modes of reasoning that may be distinctive to theory.'
I.

INSTRUMENTAL REASONING

The most admired and the most denounced form of practical
reasoning is instrumental reasoning. Bentham and his followers
admire it and think that it can be articulated in models of rational choice, and that it can be put to use in handling all of life's
disputes, since it will guide us in working out the utility of available options and choosing between options on the basis of welldefined, usually maximizing, decision procedures. On the other
hand, opponents of "the Enlightenment project" denounce instrumental reason for cloaking arbitrariness with illusory authority.,
Who is right here? The critics of instrumental reasoning trace its
supposed arbitrariness to the arbitrariness of the ends whose efficient and effective pursuit it demands. If these ends are equated
with whatever happens to be preferred, then indeed the recommendations that emerge from instrumental reasoning can never be
less arbitrary than those preferences. If we do not think of preferences and desires as intrinsically oriented to the real and the
good, as Plato did, then their efficient pursuit may not be intrinsically reasoned or intrinsically good.
All of this is robust and convincing. But it hardly amounts to
a refutation of instrumental reasoning. What it attacks, after all, is
the practice of hitching instrumental reasoning to subjective desires or preferences, which happen to arise in particular individuals at particular times, and treating this as all there is to reasoning
practically. What is attacked is a specifically modern conception of
the locus of instrumental reasoning, what assimilates it to utilitarian or economic reasoning, by which we are supposed to identify
optimal acts, rather than the more commonplace and more strictly

3 Nevertheless, I take it that both standard procedures of sifting and sorting, etc.,
and the theoretical use of reason require vindication.
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instrumental aspects of practical reason, by which we routinely
identify feasible means and foreseeable results, without necessarily
referring to preferences or to maximizing strategies. Utilitarians,
economists, and their allies have no monopoly of these more modest uses of instrumental reasoning, and instrumental reasoning is
not called into question because it has been put to exorbitant uses
by these optimizers. Indeed, it is hard to see what it would be to
reject the practice of reasoning instrumentally, if this is construed
simply as the requirement of seeking some means to those goals
one is committed to, avoiding acts which obstruct those goals, and
exercising foresight over the likely results of action. No agent in
fact evades these constraints, and those whose action conforms to
them imperfectly suffer at best failure and inefficiency, and at
worst madness or disaster.
What is objectionable is not instrumental reasoning, but a
merely instrumental conception of practical reason. Moreover, it is
objectionable not only because it assigns unjustified weight to
whatever desires and preferences agents may happen to have, but
because it makes false assumptions about the coherent structure of
those desires and preferences. In order for instrumental reasoning
alone to monopolize the tasks of practical reasoning, the preferences of agents have to be massaged so that they look connected and
transitively ordered, and then regimented by imposing a metric by
which tradeoffs between different preferences can be computed. If
we want to talk about the rationality of social as well as individual
choice, we also have to assume that this massaging and regimenting will squeeze the preferences of all agents into one uniform
metric. Economic and utilitarian rationalities, I suggest, are suspect
not because they are instrumental, but because of their fictitious
account of the formal structure of subjective ends, and because
they do not show why we should take all and only subjective ends
seriously.
However, unhitching instrumental rationality from those
intrinsically arbitrary ends does not seem in itself to tell us much
about the use of reason in resolving disputes. For instrumental
reasoning alone does not get us very far. It leaves us only with
conditional recommendations: if you are committed to some end,
seek some effective means; if you undertake some act, take account of the likely results. Where there is conflict, agreement
about effective means to given ends or about the likely results of
given acts are not enough to resolve disputes. The polemic against
instrumental rationality has in fact been misnamed, since it is
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really a polemic against weighing subjective ends so heavily and
against fictitious accounts of their formal structure. Yet the polemic is not pointless if it leads us to a clearer awareness of the limited claims on behalf of instrumental reasoning that can be justified. What is left is only a limited conception of means-ends rationality, to which neither communitarians nor greens nor anyone
else will object. However, the cost of cutting instrumental reasoning down to size seems to be that reason will offer indispensable,
but inadequate, patterns for structuring the resolution of serious
disputes.
II. SOCIAL NORMS AND REAL OPTIONS
One way forward might be to point out that instrumental
reasoning, as we actually know it, is always oriented by actual social norms. This is true even of utilitarian calculations, which have
to begin by identifying certain possible lines of action or options.
Only then can the reckoning of consequences and their evaluation
in terms of 'preferences be undertaken. This is also true of processes of reason which do not aspire to utilitarian completeness,
but use instrumental reasoning in more modest attempts to identify relations between means and ends.'
However, sets of options are not just "given" to those who
seek to reason: they are lists of act-types which particular agents
think feasible or desirable or both. It would be impossible, in
principle as well as in practice, to list all the options available in
any situation. So we always take shortcuts; in particular, we cut the
agenda down to a shortlist of options. As everyone knows, controlling the agenda is often the crucial move for controlling the
outcome. But when we control the agenda of options, for which
feasible means and likely outcomes are to be 'worked out, we in
fact allow various socially entrenched norms and standards to form
and limit the process of reasoning. To borrow a well-known example from Sartre, a son who is considering whether to leave home
to try to join the Free French, or whether to care for his mother
in a difficult situation, has picked out two socially sanctioned and
feasible action-types, and conceives of his problem as that of

4 See JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIET. A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER (1989) for
arguments that explanations which appeal to maximizing calculations cannot avoid pre-.
supposing social norms, and ONORA O'NEILL, FACEs OF HUNGER: AN ESSAY ON POVERTY,
DEVELOPMENT AND JUSTICE chs. 3-4 (1986) for more detail on the problems raised for
consequentialist reasoning by the need to identify options.
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choosing between them. He does not spend any time evaluating
options deemed undesirable, such as fleeing to Switzerland, betraying the local resistance to the Nazis or entering a monastery,
let alone the myriad possible ways of filling-or wasting-time
which might in principle be possible for him. Least of all does he
waste time on the countless imaginable options which he assumes
are not feasible in the situation.' Real life calculation either of
optimal or of feasible action is necessarily framed by assumptions
as to which actions are worth serious consideration. It is common,
but inaccurate, to speak of these actions as "available." They are
presumably thought to be available-if they were not, who would
be concerned to choose among them?-but they are also specifically taken to be part of a privileged group of "real" options, in
that they are thought to have a certain moral claim. Because instrumental reasoners cannot genuinely consider all options, their
reasoning is always framed by a grid of conventional standards and
concerns, which pick out some options as worth considering and
exclude others.
The supporters of instrumental rationality do not, it then
appears, discard or bracket ordinary social norms, but rather work
within them and emphasize one set of constraints on choosing
between the options defined by those norms. Instrumental reasoning, as it is actually done, is framed by specific grids of categories
and norms. The most serious shortcoming of an instrumental
account of practical reasoning may be less that it subordinates all
of life to a single calculus of preference or of self-interest, than
that, whether or not it is conceived of as hitched to agents' actual
preferences, it uncritically accepts established categories and
norms.
This shortcoming also raises a serious practical problem. Can
reason help resolve disputes when different parties start with differing grids of categories, or see different lists of possible actions
as constituting the real options? The fantasy that disputes can be
solved by instrumental reasoning alone evaporates fast when we
note that in seriously disputed matters the antagonists nearly always have different views of the real options. Here, it seems, instrumental reasoning will be quite helpless because categories,

5

Cf GEOFFREY HAWTHORN,

PLAUSIBLE WORLDS: POSSIBILITY AND

UNDERSTANDING

IN

HISTORY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1991). Agents do not survey all possible options, but
a much more limited set of plausible options. Moreover, their conceptions of what is
plausible embody not only a view of which acts are feasible, but a grid of social and
other norms.
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norms and options are disputed, and there will be no way in
which to reach a common understanding of the options.
Many who have realized that practical reason is hostage to
established categories and practices in this way have concluded
that it is illusory to think that there are ways of reasoning that will
work for parties who do not share a common background. They
hold that reasoning can and must take place within a framework
of shared, socially entrenched assumptions. Attempts to reason
without a shared framework of assumptions lead not to the resolution of disputes, but to loss of comprehension. The scope of
practical reason runs no wider than the boundaries of "our" form
of life or tradition or community, reaching only those who share
"4our" categories and norms.
This line of thought leads quite readily to a communitarian
conception of practical reason, where reason is seen as ensconced
.within, indeed defined by, the discourse or ways of thought of
some community or some tradition. 6 Within that community and
tradition, reasoning both about means, and in other terms sanctioned by the tradition, can be practiced, but reasoning cannot
cross the boundaries of traditions. All that reason can offer to the
resolution of disputes is what it can offer to those who already
agree on much. Reasoning is in place among those who share the
same grid of categories, the same social norms, in effect the same
conception of reason. On this account, reason itself must be
relativized to the actual norms and practices of each community of
reasoners.
Evidently this conception of reason will disappoint many who
think of reason as useful to the resolution of disputes. Disputes
are often between those who do not share or who do not wholly
share either categories or norms; and if reason is incompetent
here, it will seem that it has nothing to offer to the resolution of
the deepest and most dangerous conflicts,, in which the very terms
of debate, the very articulation of the dispute, is itself a source of
fierce dispute. And yet the presumption that disputants who are to
use forms of reasoning to work towards a resolution must share
their terms of discourse seems to be one that nobody could reject.
Unless disputants can understand one another's terms, they could

6

For a recent treatment of debates on liberalism and communitarianism, see STE-

PHEN MULHALL & ADAM SwiFT, LIBERALS AND

COMMUNITARIANS (1992).
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not be said to agree or to disagree about anything at all, hence
could not seek, let alone agree to, any resolution of their dispute.
III.

COMMUNITARIANISM, CONSERVATISM
AND ETHNOCENTRISM

At this point in reflecting on the role of reason in the resolution of disputes we seem to have reached a dilemma. Where disputants share categories, norms, in short a culture, they can use
the norms of that culture (which will no doubt include standards
of instrumental rationality) to arbitrate their disputes. The resolutions they reach may appear arbitrary from some absolute standpoint outside that culture, but nothing establishes that there is
such a standpoint. Alternatively, where disputants do not share the
categories and norms of a common culture they cannot resolve
disputes by reason. One way of reading the challenge
communitarian writers have raised to liberal political philosophy in
the last decade is that they have insisted that reasoning about
justice and politics must always be internal to the boundaries of
community, because the very basis of reasoning requires that categories and norms be shared.
If the possibilities for reasoning about practice and politics
are read in this way, the implications seem initially to be profoundly conservative and ethnocentria The boundaries of actual communities and practices at any given time will be held to be the
boundaries of possible discourse. In a sense, there can then be no
disputes with outsiders, for outsiders will be incomprehensible. To
come to understand the categories and norms of other cultures or
communities would require, not reason, but "conversion" to a
quite distinct form of life. This picture of the obstacles to reasoned articulation of disputes can be found in writings on ethics
and action by a number of Wittgensteinians, and it is not absent
in communitarian writing. 7 It points towards a deep form of ethical and even of conceptual relativism, which unnervingly makes
the most radical disputes we actually face not merely irresolvable
by reason, but incapable of articulation in ways that are intelligible

7 See PETER WINCH, ETHICS AND ACTION (1972) for some of the most perceptive
Wittgensteinian writing on the boundaries of reasoning. For communitarian endorsement
of limits, see MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983) as well as the works of ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, supra note 1. I have criticized
the former account of the boundaries of reasoning in Onora O'Neill, The Power of Exampke, in CONSTRUCTIONS OF REASON, supra note 2, and the latter in ONORA- O'NEILL,
Ethical Reasoning and Ideological Pluralism, 98 ETHICS 705 (1988).
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to rival parties. On this view, it is unsurprising that what looks like
reasoning so often becomes a fight: disputes between liberals and
religious fundamentalists, between nationalists and cosmopolitans,
between the advocates of justice and the friends of the virtues,
between ideals of public and of private life can then be avoided
by silence or confronted with violence, but since the disputants
cannot comprehend or communicate with one another they cannot be resolved by reason.
However, most communitarian writers do not take so narrow a
view of the categories and norms which define a community. In
particular, many of them have an answer at least to the charge of
conservatism. They do not suppose that reasoners are imprisoned
within the terms of discourse which they now have, and so able to
communicate only with those who share their present prison. They
note that any developed community questions, debates, interprets,
and reviews its own terms of discourse.' Communitarians who
acknowledge the historical transformation of categories and of
norms need not be conservatives. They can make sense of the selftransformation of communities, who use their current grids of
categories and norms of rational debate to develop different categories and different norms. Further, these transformations can be
judged in terms of existing norms as more or less useful, rational,
acceptable. Such communitarians not only can allow for historical
change, but for improvements. They may, for example, judge a
certain revision of existing practices an improvement because it
not merely grows out of existing practices, but renders them more
intelligible and systematic. They can preserve an understanding of
the past of theiK own community, and can glimpse possible futures
which surpass their present.
Reasoning that is based on social norms can overcome conservatism by this strategy, but ethnocentrism is harder to leave behind. Historicized conceptions of normative rationality lack a ready
way of explaining how the reasoning of outsiders can be or become accessible to them, or their own reasoning accessible to
outsiders. Whether the boundaries of community are conceived of
as narrow and exclusive, or more broadly as great cultural traditions with many separate strands, there seems to be no account of
reasoning as presupposing social norms which does not remain

8
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the exclusive preserve of insiders. A historicist turn does not therefore lead away from relativism, and does not offer a framework
which can make sense of reasoning with outsiders.
Yet this conclusion seems to be deeply at odds with our actual
experience, including our experience of dealing with outsiders.
Whether we define our community in terms of shared religion,
citizenship, nationality, ethnicity or clan, or narrowly in terms of
some specific intersection of all of these, still it seems that as a
matter of common fact we do understand most of what outsiders
are saying. It is, after all, because we more or less understand
them that we often reject their categories and norms, resent their
lack of respect for our tradition, and seek to convince them that
ours is admirable and their own defective. This suggests that there
is some hope for reasoning which links not merely "our" present
to "our" future, but "our" present to "others'" present. We are, so
to speak, conceptually multilingual, and among the languages we
usually understand are those our enemies use. Thus, Christians
and liberals may have fundamentally divergent conceptions of
human beings, yet many of them are familiar with both conceptions. If this sort of multilingualism is widespread, then why
should the plurality of communities, each with their distinctive
categories and norms, prevent the resolution of disputes by reason?
However, this appeal to our cultural "multilingualism" may
seem too fast. If disputes are to be resolved by reason we surely
have not merely to understand what the other party is saying, but
to agree with them on at least some matters. Without points of
agreement there are no shared premisses from which any process
of reasoning can work. Understanding others' terms of discourse
surely does not require us to agree or accept those terms of discourse, let alone the views of those who use them. On the contrary, it seems that, often enough, understanding others' beliefs is
the basis for fierce resistance to their very categories of thought.
Heretics are identified and persecuted, whether by the Inquisition
or by the KGB, on the basis of a considerable understanding of
the views they are propounding, but there is no agreement.
This conception of understanding in the absence of any
agreement is illusory. Even persecution, opposition, and lesser
forms of resistance are predicated not on understanding alone,
but inevitably on some range of agreement. In the first place,
there must be enough agreement for an understanding of others'
terms and categories to be possible. Inquiry and interrogation,
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through which disagreement comes to light, must both be framed
by much agreement. Any community whose boundaries were so
impervious that those whom the boundary separates could not
communicate with one another, would have boundaries which
obstructed not merely agreement but disagreement. Perhaps such
-adically alien communities are imaginable. If they exist, no reasonipg will contribute to resolving disputes with them-indeed,
hostilities with such "aliens" are perhaps not to be thought of as
disputes. However, the actual situation of human communities is
not like this: disputes abound, and with them some footholds for
their rational resolution.

LV. CONSTRUCTING POINTS OF AGREEMENT
But footholds may not be enough. We do not doubt, for
example, that the Israelis and Palestinians understand one
another's positions very well, and that there must be, therefore,
much on which they agree. However, we have good reason to
doubt whether this measure of agreement can provide a basis for
reasoned resolution of the matters on which they are in dispute.
The insufficiency of reason on this matter is not, in fact, confined
to cases where communities differ deeply in religion, language,
culture, and tradition. We all know cases of feuding relatives who
understand one another all too well, who agree on all too much,
but whose dispute still cannot be resolved by reason. This suggests
that the real limitation to reasoned resolution of disputes is not
that categories and norms are not shared, and that there are no
points of agreement, but simply that in many cases there are not
enough points of agreement, or not the right points of agreement. Disputes may be intractable because, despite agreement on
many points, these may offer very little prospect of reasoned resolution of the particular matters most fiercely disputed.
Hence, if we are interested in the reasoned resolution of
disputes, we need to take account not only of instrumental rationality (cut down to size) and of actually available points of agreement between particular disputants, but of the construction of further points of agreement that may be more useful in reasoning
towards agreement on the matters in dispute. Yet, in formulating
this thought, have we not reached the limit of the distinctive role
that reasoning can play in the resolution of disputes? For is not
the construction of new points of agreement a matter of pressure
or conversion, of re-education or indoctrination, of arm-twisting
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and manipulation, rather than of reason? Have we not accepted,
at this point, that reason can only get to work in sifting and sorting, in comparing and making coherent the matters to which
disputants are already committed?
There is one further reasoned strategy which may be used to
construct points of agreement between disputants who find that
they still lack sufficient points of agreement to negotiate or bargain, or more generally to reason about the matters at issue between them. This further strategy can best be explicated by reflecting on a quite minimal demand for- anything to count as reasoning between two parties who disagree on some matters. The only
moves that will count as reason will be ones both parties can follow. Insofar as we seek to resolve disputes by reasoning, the underlying principles on which we rely must be sharable principles.
For example, because the principle of instrumental rationality
cannot be successfully rejected by any agent, it has a wholly general authority for the conduct of life, and so counts as a principle of
practical reason.
However, the rejection of unshareable principles demands
more than acceptance of instrumental rationality: it also places
certain substantive demands on how we should act, which are
usually considered moral demands. Here I shall say nothing about
the moral status of those demands, but will try to articulate why
they are demands of reason. Put intuitively, if the kernel of practical reasoning is a matter of basing one's action and communication on principles that others too can follow, then those who
reason must reject strategies which disable others' capacities to
follow principles. Some of the principles practical reasoners must
therefore reject can be readily identified. For example, principles
of destroying or injuring others' capacities for action are in principle unshareable: we cannot expect those whom we intend to destroy or injure to act as they could if not destroyed or injured.
Destruction and injury take many forms: violence destroys and
injures bodies; coercion undermines the will; deception injures
understanding. Each of these has unending variety. Those who
make principles of violence, of coercion or of deception fundamental to their conduct of disputes cannot claim to be seeking
reasoned resolution to those disputes. Rather they are resorting to
methods of setting disputes which, in principle, will bypass the
agency and the reasoning of those with whom they are in dispute.
If reasoning has to avoid relying on principles that others cannot
share or follow, then it cannot be simply a matter of patterning
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action and communication according to certain formal structures,
or of respecting instrumental rationality. Rather reasoned action
has to be based on principles of helping to respect and to secure,
rather than to damage and destroy, the capacities for action of
those with whom one seeks to reason.
This argument does not show that those who are committed
to reason may never use violence, coercion or deception, or that
they may never injure in other ways. Actual human disputes often
cannot be resolved without some injury to some parties. For example, the standard systems of dispute" resolution within states with a
constitutional and legal order, including fair administrative and
legal procedures, work against a background of limited and controlled uses of violence and coercion by the police and by penal
institutions. Perhaps we can devise no way of organizing our public life which is less injuring, and thus more reasoned. If so, a
commitment to reason in these domains of life will be a commitment, not to an unattainable total elimination of all forms of
injury, but to building and rebuilding both institutions and characters in ways that will minimize destruction and injury of agents
and of their capacities, so minimizing reliance on intrinsically
unreasoned procedures.
In many domains of dispute, we do not do as well in minimizing reliance on intrinsically unreasoned procedures as we do in
the public sphere of well ordered states. Transnational disputes,
disputes in states where constitutional and legal order .are absent
or fragile, and disputes in aspects of life where legal and even
social order do not penetrate all are open to methods of dispute
resolution which do not reject destruction and injury-for example, war, crime and domestic violence. In these domains the sign
that disputes are being increasingly settled by reason would not be
that disputants increasingly align their action or discourse with
certain formal procedures, -but that they seek and respect transformations of institutional setting and individual character which
secure the undamaged and unthreatened survival of all parties to
any dispute. Only those who are committed to effectively institutionalizing this objective can claim to be committed to reasoned
resolution of disputes; Those who are not so committed accept-and at the limit may inflict-avoidable injury to reasoners;
in doing so they too fail to reason.

